Conferencias

Towards the biggest breaking of the political and economic order of the century

Working Paper presented to the Seminar of the European Study Commission of the Institute for Strategic and International Studies.

North South Relations in the Western Mediterranean, Lisbon 24-26 June 1987

"Theories are the nests we need to catch this thing that we have called the World", wrote Karl Popper. I am glad, however, to be here as a journalist and consequently not supposed to produce any theory. I deal with facts and although I admit that a little theory is necessary to put facts together, I prefer a more sceptical approach of the subjects. Andre Malraux said once: "The West doesn't stops talking about the values it defends, but what are those values? Western countries are certainly defending some values in the Mediterranean, but what are they really defending and how are they defending it?.

In 1978 I was in Teheran just a few days before the Shah's fall. That was my first trip to Iran and I talked to as many Iranians as possible. What the Iranians said, and what the Europeans said, was considerably different. Finally I went to see a friend who at the time was the head of the Iranian branch of a well known Spanish bank, and I explained him what I had been told. "Don't let them fool you" he said to me, "Nothing will happen here. The Shah will take the tanks out to the streets. Ten thousand people may die; one hundred thousand people may die, but nothing will change here". The Shah is of course gone and the Gulf war is there to prove, ten years later the vitality of the Iranian revolution. Diplomats are today everywhere to assess the mounting Islamic roar of the South world, but wherever they may be Westerners as my friend, keep saying that "Nothing will change here".

Disregarding the fact that the concept of North South is not very precise in what concerns the Western Mediterranean countries, I will deal here with "North South tensions.. "South South tensions", "Tensions outside the Western Mediterranean" but affecting directly the region, and some "Prospects for the future".

The South: Land and Men

As in the past, the most important of the South countries in economy and population is and lives, in the coastal fringe. Except for mining and oil whenever they have it, the rest of the territories are under-developed and partially neglected. In spite of the independences obtained in the fifties, those that have governed in the last thirty years in fact only five men, King Mohamed V, King Hassan II, Presidents Houari Boumedienne and Chadly Benyedid, and the Supreme fighter Habib Bourguiba have not succeeded in to put an end to the big regional disparities that all of them found when their countries became independent. In the three cases (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) the economical disparities coincide with the natural regions and different ethnic groups. Some abandoned rural zones of the Rif mountains in Morocco depend exclusively from the bank transfers by the Moroccan immigrants in Europe. The Great Kabilia in Alqeria is the epicentre of the Berber resurgence.

Fertility index in the three countries are threefold or fourfold the index in countries of the North. In Algeria the fertility is 7.4 child per woman; in Morocco is 6.6 child per woman, and in Tunisia 5.4 child per woman. Traditions and culture makes the tendency very difficult to change. Tunisia introduced some years ago family planning techniques but the results were disappointing so far and in any case in open reqression.

Demographic explosion is a fact to be considered and a reality. A Moroccan economist has put it abruptly as follows: "For us it is not any more a matter of vote but a matter of food". Eating is precisely the most difficult thing. While the population growths in a geometrical progression, the production of food in those three countries has relatively diminished. The three of them use to produce at the time of the independence enough food to satisfy their needs. Today food shortness ranges from 30 to 50 percent of the needs in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

North South Tensions

The second extension of the EEC to twelve members (Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986) and the possible consequences for the South Mediterranean countries is by far the most important new element in this geographical area after the independences of the Fifties. Dependent on the manner in which the EEC will approach the problem, this is going to introduce at medium or long term a breakdown in the North South relations. Consequently he traditional political, social, cultural, and economic order that had prevailed in the Western Mediterranean in the last one hundred years will be modified.

The political, human and economic consequences are very difficult to evaluate at present, but they range, symbolically, from the request of King Hassan II that Morocco be admitted as a member to the Treaty of Rome, to the declaration of the Moroccan Islamist leader Abdessalam Yassine that "the Iranian revolution is an example of the need to return to the original islam, to the Quranic message, to find the Arab Muslims roots, far away from the vicious consumerism and search of material welfare of the West and away from the national and artificial borders introduced in the Muslim world as a result of the Western influence".

The whole North of Africa, and the Mediterranean Asia is Arab Muslim, and in those countries, where illiteracy reaches very high percentages, the Quran is the only cultural and political common denominator. The fate of the three millions immigrants from the Maghreb countries that live inside the EEC is presently aggravated by the extension of the EEC to twelve, but is not directly and exclusively a consequence of it. The necessity to limit the immigration of Maqhreb workers started to be felt after the 1973 oil crisis. Some countries like France, which is the one with the largest immigrant community inside its borders, created incentives to the return to their countries of even those who had already acquired permanent resident status

This is a problem for the South countries. It furthermore coincides with the major economic crisis in all of them derived from the breakdown of what they call the "postcolonial pact", that is, the special economic relations between the former colonial powers and their ancient colonies. Just after the independences of Morocco and Tunisia Algeria is a special case from the French (and Spanish) Protectorate, France maintained and even increased the traditional flux of trade with them, increasing at the same time the dependence of those countries from the French markets.

a) The 1969 Association Aqreements

After the first extension, the EEC started to raise protectionists barriers against Third World agricultural products. A new phase in the North South relations was initiated in 1969 by the signing of the so called ∞Association Agreements". France, to protect its interests, managed to introduce in the Treaty of Rome some clauses recognizing the specificity of its relations with its ancients colonies, and the EEC accepted the maintenance during a transitional period of these specific relations. Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerians products (before the Algerian independence), were automatically considered as French products.

The Association Agreements were however the first official regulation of the North South economic relations. Most of the agricultural products of the South countries were allowed to enter the EEC with important reduction of customs rights, while some other were exempted. Although the tendency to autarchy was reinforced in the EEC with the Politique Agricole Commune (PAC), preferential agreements were signed with many countries. In particular the EEC signed the LomÈ Convention with the 45 ACP (Asian, Caribbean and Pacific) countries in replacement of the YaoundÈ Convention. Most Maghreb economist sustain that this led to a stronger geographical concentration of their countries commercial relations with the EEC.

b) The 1976 "Cooperation Agreements"

From 1969 to 1976 the European Community confirmed the economic solidarity among its members. The "Green Europe" was reinforced towards agricultural self sufficiency . The monetary mechanism were harmonised. Between 1969 and 1976 the Preferential Agreements were extended to Spain and Israel, direct competitors of the agricultural exporters of the Maghreb countries. For the first time the neqotiations with the South Mediterranean countries were global and included finance, technical cooperation and hand labour. Limitations against South exports were introduced in exchange of financial compensations that Morocco and Tunicia considered insufficient

According to Maghreb economists these Cooperation Aqreements resulted in the freezing of their traditional exports and disturbed the incipient industrialisation because it was made dependent of conjunctures and changes in the structure of European economies. The immigration flux was stopped, and many workers were expelled. That had negative effects on the economies of the three countries, all of them with exceeding manpower and unemployed. Furthermore, in the three cases (in lesser extent in the case of Algeria), the bank transfers of the immigrant workers in the EEC had started to fill an structural function for their economies. In the case of Morocco, the transfers have by far exceeded the hard currency income derived from the phosphate exports (80 percent of the whole exports) (3).

The Second Extension of the EEC to Spain and Portugal

The second extension of the EEC in January 1986, arrived in very unfavourable circumstances for the South Mediterranean countries. The most characteristic facts in those societies are: low economic Growth, high rates of unemploy ment, inflation, and dependence of exports. The new EEC members are their direct competitors in all the line of exports. The admission of Spain is the most feared because of its agricultural potential and its geographical proximity to EEC markets. The Moroccans, the most effected by it, consider that it will have "devastating effects" on their economy. With Greece, Spain and Portugal, the EEC will be self-sufficient in agriculture and for some products (wine and potatoes) will have surplus. Furthermore, the three have too, like their South Mediterranean counterparts, high rate of unemployment.

The 1976 Cooperation Agreements came to an end and their renegotiation is still pending in the three cases. In November 1985 the EEC Council gave instructions to the Commission to discuss protocols of agreement with the three Maghreb countries as a result of the EEC extension to Spain and Portugal. The negotiation with Morocco, by far the most difficult, is blocked at present because Morocco considers "absolutely insufficient" the compensations offered by the EEC . The Protocols with Algeria and Tunisia have been completed in June 1987 and are ready to be signed.

• How did we arrive to such a serious situation? I will briefly recall the history.

1) The case of Algeria

At the independence in 1962 Algeria exported to France citrus, fruits, vine, phosphates, minerals, and oil. The Algerian territory was very unequally developed. The coastal and sub-coastal fringe was relatively rich, but the Aures and Titteri regions appeared abandoned. The World recession of the Thirties and the Second World War resulted in the orientation of the Algerian agriculture by the French settlers in Algeria, just like in Morocco and Tunisia, towards the French market. Most of the agricultural land was in the hands of French settlers. After the independence the Algerians abruptly nationalized the land. This process of nationalisation was favoured by the massive departure of the French. Between 1962 and 1963, in less than one year of independence, the Algerian government had taken over, 2.500.000 hectares (4).

But the French left a society and en economy heavily dependent of the French society and the French economy. The restrictions imposed by France to Algerian agricultural products since the beginning as a retaliation, brought to the Algerians the same problems that the Moroccans and Tunisians will confront now because of this structural dependence. The Algerians solved it in a radical manner. In spite of the high social cost, President Houari Boumedienne ordered the complete rooting out of the vineyards.

But agriculture was not the only conflict between France and Algeria. In 1962 there were 350.000 Algerian immigrants in France. By 1975 this figure had doubled and ten years late it had tripled. Today there is what is called "the second generation∞ of Algerians born in France that are the cornerstone of the controversy between Algeria and the French government.

The Evian Agreements, which led the pace to independence, had resulted in the maintaining of France jurisdiction over the Algerians oilfields. After the independence the Algerian FLN moved gradually to get hold of this important sector of the economy. The 24 February 1971 president Boumedienne announced the nationalisation of the oil. French companies boycotted Algerian oil for a while but finally reached some agreements with the Algerian government.

Oil gave Algeria the possibility of a strong activism inside the OPEC countries and so was born the idea of a new international economic order strongly advocated by Algeria inside OPEC and the Non Aligned Movement. The peak of this activism was reached in 1973 when Algeria was elected to the presidency of the Non Aligned Movement. Inside OPEC Algeria is allied with Libya and Iran against Saudi Arabia.

But just as the phosphates gets the Moroccans apart from their American competitors and close to the Russians, oil brings Algeria close to the Western economic system. The biggest contracts for gas were signed with the United States companies El Paso, Panhandle and others. After a few years of quarrel because of the price, the American companies have started again to withdraw Algerian gas. Two of the main Algerian projects concerning gas, one submarine gas pipeline linking Algeria through Tunisia and Sicily with Italy and North Europe, is already achieved and functioning. A second gas pipeline linking Algeria with Spain and Portugal is scheduled to go through Northern Morocco, has not yet started because of the political conflict between Morocco and Algeria. The project will probably be derived to the Strait of Gibraltar to avoid the Moroccan territory.

Western countries are among the most important oil clients of Algeria as well. Hydrocarbons amounts for a 97,8 percent of Algerian exports as a whole, and two thirds of them go to EEC countries. Simultaneously Algeria is today the most important Mediterranean market for EEC countries. Its foreign debt has attained 17.000 million dollars and in 1985 its service of the debt amounted to 4.200 million dollars, but Algeria has no important problem with the international banks.

Algeria is the first Maghreb country to introduce young and educated cadres in the main posts of the economy. The different congresses of the party since Boumedienne death concluded in the necessity to slow down the industrialisation and concentrate more attention in agriculture. This was finally decided as a policy in the Five Year Plan 1985 1989 that clearly established the need to increase the agricultural production to reduce dependence from food imports. As a paradox to the strong control by the State of the industrial and oil sector, 62 percent of the cultivated land is already in private hands. Algeria exports very little of its agricultural production and consequently has no important problem with the extension of the EEC to Spain and Portugal.

2) The Case of Morocco

The base of the modern Moroccan economy, just like Algerian and Tunisian economies, was created during the Protectorate and oriented towards the French markets. Phosphates, mines, sardines, citrus, fruits and vegetables, wine production, were controlled by French settlers. The first Moroccan national government of Dr. Abdallah Ibrahim wanted to break this dependence and decided a five Year plan (1960 1964) which included nationalisation of the agricultural land and reorientation of the Moroccan agriculture towards satisfaction of Moroccan food needs. But Ibrahim government was dismissed in May 1960 by King Mohamed V under the pressure of Crown Prince Mulay Hassan and France whose interest were threatened by nationalisations, and the agricultural reform could not be implemented. Foreign land in Morocco was not nationalised until 1973. But by that time most of the Moroccan agriculture was export oriented and the trend was continued in spite of warnings from local economists. Since the Association Agreements through the Cooperation Agreements until the extension of the EEC to Spain and Portugal, the Moroccan agriculture suffered from various droughts, as well as protective measures against their exports by EEC countries.

France advocates today exactly the reform that the Moroccan nationalist government wanted to introduce in 1960, that is diversification of the Moroccan markets, and reorientation of cultures to satisfy Moroccan food needs. Parallel to the decline of the traditional flux of agricultural exports to the EEC, Morocco will suffer more than any other country from EEC restrictions against North African workers. The bank transfers of those workers are presently the main source of foreign income for the Moroccan economy. Besides many neglected regions of the country depend entirely on those transfers for their survival.

Just as oil and gas brings Algeria close to Western World, phosphates and agriculture may bring Morocco's economy close to the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Ahmed Osman visited the Soviet Union in march 197? and signed four agreements which according to the Moroccan press ∞will transform Morocco in the first economic and commercial partner of the URSS among the Arab and African countries". The most important of the four was the agreement for the exploitation of the phosphates deposits of Meskalla.

The objective of the agreement was to produce ten million tons of phosphate a year. The cost of the project, to be financed by the URSS, was estimated at 10.000 millions dollars. For political reasons the project did not go very far. A complementary agreement established exchanges during 30 years. As part of the agreement it was foreseen that Morocco would pay to the Soviet Union with phosphates, and with citrus. With the difficulties they are encountering now with the EEC, Morocco has hinted that it may renegotiate that agreement to obtain a market for its citrus and phosphates.

The 26 November 1985 the EEC Council instructed the Commission to negotiate with Morocco. The Moroccans argued that it was vital for them to export to the EEC. A proposal was made at the time to Morocco but the Moroccan government declared itself deceived by it in spite that the EEC had accepted one of the most important Moroccan demand. The EEC had accepted to extend to Morocco in the two phases of the transitional period (1986 1990 and 1990 1995) the automatic modulation of the entrance prices for Moroccan exports. However after the meeting of the Council of the 22 April 1986 the instructions were changed and the original offer was modified in accordance. The "automatic modulation" was changed to "eventual modulation".

Morocco refused to go on with negotiations, and proclaimed its intentions to discuss globally with the EEC. 8y global discussions the Moroccan government meant that the total of its relations with the EEC, trade deficit, Moroccan imports from the EEC, and so on, will be put in the same negotiating basket with, for instance, the fishing agreement with Spain and Portugal that expires next 31st July. For Spain this is an important issue that affects 700 boats fishing in the Moroccan waters. A deal that concerns 20000 fishermen directly, and 100000 families directly or indirectly related with fishing and fishing industries.

The "automatic modulation of the entrance price" in the EEC for the Moroccan exports is the core of the problem. If granted, it will place Morocco inside the EEC for the next ten years on the same footing that Spain for agricultural exports. The Spanish authorities have so far refused to admit this concession on the grounds that if it was granted to Morocco, what will be the difference for Spain as a member of the EEC?

3) The Case of Tunisia

Although important for Tunisia, due to the amount of Tunisians agricultural exports to the EEC, the case of Tunisia should not represent any unsolvable problem. The history of Tunisian agriculture is just the similar to that of Algeria and Morocco. The structural dependence of the French market started during the Protectorate. But the Tunisians have relatively diversified their exports. Notwithstanding sixty percent of their commerce exchanges are with the EEC. In any case, their demands to the EEC concern the maintaining of a contingent of 250.000 hectoliters of wine plus 50.000 hectoliters of bottled vine, 60.000 tons of fruits and vegetables, and another contingent of 50.000 olive oil. Tunisia started exploratory negotiations with the EEC in 1963 and since then they have modified their agricultural policy with the aim of reducing food import s and attaining self-sufficiency

General Considerations

There have never been smooth and confident North South relations. The North African countries are the South partners of the EEC as a whole. But Spain, Greece and Portugal are the South of the EEC. The leaders of these three countries have said in different occasions what Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva told President Francois Mitterrand during his visit to Paris last0 January 25. 1907: "We are against a two speeds Europe. We want more determination in the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and an increased access of the less developed countries in South Europe to the community funds".

In the case of the South Mediterranean countries, relations with the North are made more difficult because of the colonial past. The way South countries obtained their independences have strongly influenced the present state of their relations with the EEC and their foreign policy. In the case of Spain the liquidation of its colonial possessions still affects the relations with Morocco mainly because of the Saharan conflict. Furthermore the Moroccans claim the "return of Ceuta Melilla and the islands of the Northern coast to Moroccan sovereignty", and assimilate this case to a colonial issue.

South-South Tensions: The Saharan conflict

At present this conflict is blocked. Morocco pretends that they have consolidated their military presence in spite of the important attacks by Polisario front since the beginning of this year in the area of Mahbes and Al Farsya. The construction of a sixth contention wall, from phosphate areas of Bu Craa to the coast and all along the Mauritanian border, is intended to prevent Polisario attacks from the sea. Any further attacks to this region will necessarily implicate the use of the Mauritanian territory and consequently Mauritania will be made responsible for the attacks. The present situation is that the United Nations through last General Assembly Resolution 41/16 has instructed its Secretary General, Javier PÈrez de Cuellar, to prospect with the interested and concerned parties the possibility to held a referendum of self determination in the territory. Resolution 41/16 calls for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front prior to any referendum. Morocco rejects these direct talks.

The conditions for a referendum of self-determination were established in different AU meetings and adopted by the United Nations. Disregarding the problem of getting Morocco and the Polisario Front to seat at the same table, there are signs that Morocco will not implement the conditions set for the referendum. These conditions call for the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from the territory and the replacement of the Moroccan Administration by an International Administration during the referendum operations. To determine who will qualify to vote could be, too, a very time consuming exercise. No solution is possible for the time being except if the International Community is accepts King Hassan II view that the referendum should be "confirmative".

This problem, as all North/South problems, has been influenced since the beginning by colonial and political considerations. In 1974 and 1975 the United States and Frane urged the Spanish government to give the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. The Spanish Foreign Ministry, that did not share the Spanish government views on this subject, introduced a formulation of the 14 November 1975 agreement that has been afterwards the cause of many arguments. He established a distinction between "Administration of the Territory" and "Sovereignty of the territory" and claimed that only the Administration has been transferred to Morocco and Mauritania.

Still today, Spanish and Portuguese fishing agreements with Morocco, presently under discussion by the EEC, could be a subject of controversy. The Polisario front has requested the EEC not to negotiate with Morocco fishing rights over the Saharan waters, arguing that the Madrid Tripartite agreement did not transfer the sovereignty of the territory to Morocco and that besides, when Mauritania abandoned unilaterally the Oued ed Dahab province (former Spanish Rio de Oro) in August 1979, the territory was immediately annexed by Morocco. The Moroccan position on this subject was explained to me a few days ago by the Moroccan Secretary of State for the Relations with the EEC, Mohamed Seqat. "If the EEC wants to fish in these waters", he said to me, "it must recognize the Moroccan jurisdiction".

In my opinion no solution of the Saharan conflict is possible without a political agreement between Morocco and Alqeria (and the Polisario). The most the Algerians have offered so far to King Hassan is a personal union between the Western Saharan and Morocco, just as the personal union between King Hassan and colonel Ghaddafi in the already buried experiment of the Arab African Union (UAA). The Moroccans refused this offer because they believed it would lead to the independence of the Western Sahara.

The most the Moroccans have offered to Algeria and the Polisario is a common exploitation of the iron deposits of Gara Yebilet (in Algerian territory )r a way through the Western Sahara to the sea, and a general amnesty for the Polisario leaders and their integration in the Moroccan Administration. Both positions are apart enough and prevent forecasting any agreement. Morocco officially expects a change in the Algerian regime, and the Algerians officially expects King Hassan regime to crumble because of economic difficulties. The two meetings already held between King Hassan and President Chadly Benyedid in 1983 and 1987 seems the result of miscalculations by both sides, any side believing that the other is ripe enough to accept the other conditions.

This problem will still affect North South relations for quite a while. Algeria and Morocco make relations with foreign partners dependent of their attitudes toward the conflict.

North-South Tensions: Ceuta, Melilla and the Spanish Mediterranean Islands

Until 1965 Moroccan official policy on the subject was to link its demand with the Gibraltar problem between Spain and Great Britain. The admission of Spain in the NATO in 1982 and the its admission in the EEC in January 1966, has changed the Moroccan approach of the issue. King Hassan stated before the Club de la Presse of Radio Europe 1 in April 1987 in Marrakech that "The problem of Ceuta and Melilla is anachronistic and cannot be compared to the Gibraltar problem. Gibraltar is in Europe and is in the hands of an European power allied to Spain inside the NATO and the EEC. It is just a misunderstanding. But Ceuta and Melilla are in Africa, and they are enclaves. For us this is a colonial fact."

Consequently Morocco does not intend to associate the case of Ceuta and Melilla with that of Gibraltar any more. King Hassan proposed in January 1987 to King Juan Carlos the creation a joint commission to think about the future of Ceuta and Melilla and the islands. The Spanish government was not exactly delighted with this proposal and as a reaction it proposed to grant the towns a regional autonomic status.

In fact the promulgation in 1985 of a law to regulate the residence in Spain of foreigners, and its application to the Muslims living in Ceuta an Melilla was the occasion for a serious friction between the Spanish government and the more or less 60,000 Muslims living in both towns. The lack of sensitivity of the Spanish government towards the specific problem of this community resulted in a very conflictive situation and jeopardized any possible cooperation of the local Muslim population.

How far, how fast, the conflict of Ceuta and Melilla will develop into a major issue between Morocco and Spain depends now on King Hassan. The position of Spain concerning the Western Sahara will certainly influence it. In any case, the Spanish Moroccan Commission proposed by king Hassan to study the future of these two towns is the point of departure for the last phase of this conflict.

The Political Use Of Islam And The Koran

Instead of fundamentalism or integrisme as the French name the same phenomenon, I prefer to talk of "use of the Quran and Islam as a political weapon" or just "Islamism". I think this is a more accurate description of what is all that about. Consequently when I speak here about Islamism I am talking about what everyone knows as fundamentalism. Winston Churchill used to say that the Mediterranean is the low belly of Europe. Between the North and the South of the Mediterranean exists strong political and economic interdependences. Stability and security in the South affects the stability and security in the North. I do not think any one here will doubt the wisdom and validity of this statement.

It is a fact that the Arab Muslim society, the society we have as neighbour in the South, is finding it difficult to adapt herself to the present times. The nationalist movements that fought against colonial powers everywhere in the Fifties apparently brought with them this modernity that could have changed the political face of the South. Habib Bourguiba was one of those who dared to defy publicly the most backwards traditionalism in his country. King Mohamed V did the same in Morocco. To protect their interests the Western powers fought them and welcomed the arrival of more cooperative governments. The most backwards Islam has taken the front scene in the last ten years. Furthermore, the most radical Islam, the Iranian promoted and financed Islam, is influencing all ancient Islamic currents in the Moghreb.

At the same time, the nationalist were left outside by the monopoly of power their governments exercised. Today they are intellectually ailing and Islamist are taking the floor. It will take very long to explain how did we arrive to this situation but let me just remember two facts that contributed to it: 1) the adulteration of democracy by the different governments, and 2) the gradual concentration of power in the hands of the heads of State in these three countries that made superfluous the existence of democratic institutions.

Algeria was since the beginning a one party system. But after the Boumedienne era there was a more power-sharing among the military elite which, in fact, was always the power behind the power. The Parti Socialiste Destourien, PSD, of Tunisia has acted as if it were in a one party system and President Habib Burguiba acted on his turn as if he were in a Presidential system and accumulated all] the decision making power for decades. His approaching succession, for evident biological reasons, is the cause of great concern now.

The most evident power concentration is probably the case of King Hassan of Morocco. The King is civil and religious chief. Article 24 of the Constitution stipulates that the King appoints the Primer Minister and the Ministers. Article 59 says that the government is responsible before the King and the Parliament. According to Article 25 the King presides over the Council of Ministers. Article 66 gives him the power to reject any law approved by the Parliament with which he disagrees. Article 35 gives him the power to declare the State of Emergency a facility that he has used from from June 1965 to July 1975. The ministry of Interior, the Administration of Defence, the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police, the State Security (internal and external), and the Gendarmerie, are considered "exclusive domains of the Crown". Finally the King personally decides the appointment of the 460 higher posts of the Administration.

In spite of the importance of the King official powers, in practice they are always used with en extensive sense. The "system of quotas" is a common practice during elections. According to it, the ministry of Interior decides, previous to the elections, the future political map of the country. Politicians have to bargain with the minister of Interior to avoid under evaluation of their parties. Politicians like former Foreign minister Mohamed Boucetta denounced and recognized this practice during the last 1985 elections. The result is a dull political life, an uninterested and uninteresting Parliament, sleepy and head-scratching deputies, and a government that is not even nominated according to the prearranged electoral results.

As a consequence Islam is in frank expansion in all of these three countries. In the country of The Commander of the Faithful as well. Count Alexandre de Marenches, the former head of the french SDECE has explained (5) how worried he was when the Shah of Iran landed in Morocco after his fall in January 1979. He fled immediately to Morocco and convinced King Hassan not to be permanent host of the Shah.

In spite of what all confident friends of Morocco believe, an underground Islam has developed in the last decade. More than 2000 clandestine "praying places" exists altogether with the official Mosques. Some twenty different Islamist groups organise the believers. Their presence is not more evident because of police control, but they exists. Abdessalam Yassine, one of the admirers of Imam Khomeiny, and one of the most prolific Islamic scholars in the Maghreb, has widely elaborated about the Islamist idea of the future Islamic society (6). The way to arrive to it is: "Return to the original Islamic sources, that is abolition of corruption and other Western vices like alcohol, prostitution, unequal distribution of richness and social justice". "Our traditional elites have been infiltrated and morally weakened by the generations of intellectuals and cadres formed in the Western way and far from our values. Now, in the land of Islam new liberation winds blows and the popular underground roar is becoming audible and is manifesting itself with devastating earthquakes. Classes must disappear and must be substituted by a communitarian society which stands together. The method for that is Jihad (religious war/effort) and not Nidal (class war). Our brother fighters are correctly conducting this fight in Iran."

The question is: Is it still time to avoid the complete breakdown between the North and the South? Can North still help the South to look towards the future and not to the past?

The North South Dialogue

Charles De Gaulle was probably the first to promote significantly a Mediterranean free of foreign fleets. The Mediterranean lake of peace was the most common ground of any North South dialogue. Revolutionaries in Algeria repeated it afterwards meaning that Russians and Americans should go. Moroccans and Tunisians have said the same but with the hope that only the Russians would leave. Now that in the four countries of the North (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) there are socialist governments or socialists presidents, the idea of a North South dialogue appeared again. President Francois Mitterrand suggested it during his 1983 visit to Morocco. His proposal was not welcomed at the time. Spain feared that the others will try to force it to discuss the economic consequences of its admission to the EEC for the South even before it took place. The Algerians were afraid that the others would like to seek a compromise over the Saharan conflict detrimental for the Polisario front.

In november 1986 Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, discussed the possibility of a North South dialogue in the Western Mediterranean with President Mitterrand in Paris, and in December 1986 Mitterrand and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez raised again the subject. The idea of the creation of a "contact group∞ was launched. Spanish head of the government, Felipe Gonzalez, talked about it during his firsts days of January 1987 trip to Tunisia and Egypt. Tunisian Prime Minister Rashid Sfar told him that "Spain, because of its geographical situation, its history, and its human dimension, plays an important role in the security in the Mediterranean". President Gonzalez talked not only about the necessity of a Mediterranean dialogue, but even about the necessity of a common European position towards the Middle East conflict . A few days later Bettino Craxi visited Palma de Mallorca and raised the subject once more. According to him it was necessary to "stimulate a common policy of the Mediterranean countries, to mediate in the conflicts of the region". During his visit to Tunisia Felipe Gonzales met PLO leader Yasser Arafat and the Arab League Secretary General, Chadly Klibi, to whom he said that the Arab dialogue should be revitalised. A trip to Spain by Klibi, that should be followed by another trip of Klibi to the EEC, was arranged. The date was fixed for the 24th June but, unexpectedly the Arab League Secretarty General has postponed the visit sine die. The problems that have so far prevented such dialogue remain today the same.